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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Addendum

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council an addendum to the report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), issued as document S/1994/1422, annex.

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Annex

Addendum to the eighth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission

Appendix I

A. Missiles

1. The Special Commission has continued its activities in the missile area under the mandate established by Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). During 1994, the Commission will have conducted 15 missile inspections, more than the combined number of inspections undertaken in 1992 and 1993.

2. In order to provide the Council with an assessment of Iraq's compliance with the obligations set out under section C of resolution 687 (1991), the Commission intensified its endeavours to resolve outstanding issues in respect of Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes. In parallel, major efforts have been exerted to establish ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's missile-related activities and dual-purpose capabilities. As a result of these efforts, the essential elements of the monitoring system were in place as from the middle of August 1994. The system has been declared provisionally operational and is currently undergoing testing for thoroughness, reliability and the integrated operation of the system's components.

1. Past programmes

(a) Information

3. Iraq is required, under the terms of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), to provide full, final and complete disclosures on all aspects of its proscribed programmes and to respond fully, completely and promptly to questions and requests from the Commission. As a result of inspections, lengthy discussions with Iraq's authorities and other bodies and detailed analysis, the Commission now possesses a much fuller and more accurate picture of Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes than that presented by Iraq in its official "full, final and comprehensive report" submitted in May 1992.

4. During the reporting period, the Commission has intensified its investigations into issues related to past proscribed missile programmes. Special emphasis has been placed on verification of information provided by Iraq concerning foreign acquisition of proscribed missiles, their components and related production capabilities. Validation of this, and other information provided by Iraq, has been energetically pursued by the Commission. Specific assistance to facilitate this process has been requested from a number of countries. While some Governments were unable or unwilling to confirm or deny

details of supplies of equipment or assistance given to Iraq prior to the imposition of sanctions, the Commission has received many positive responses. Some 14 different bilateral meetings have been held during the reporting period on this matter.

5. The resulting information obtained from Governments and the Commission's own intensive analysis has, in some cases, revealed contradictions or highlighted omissions in Iraq's declarations. This has necessitated new rounds of discussions with Iraq in order to establish the true facts. Major issues related to past programmes were discussed with Iraqi representatives during a round of high-level talks in September 1994. Several inspection teams addressed in detail relevant issues with Iraqi officials and experts. However, there continues to be a proclivity for Iraq to fail to volunteer information and to confirm specific information only when a preponderance of evidence is produced by the Commission. This inevitably undermines the confidence the Commission can have in the completeness of Iraq's declarations. Furthermore, in some instances repeated statements by Iraq that equipment was not procured for proscribed programmes have proved to be incorrect. Iraq's continued insistence that all documents related to its past proscribed activities have been destroyed has also proved to be incorrect.

6. Some explanations and clarifications from Iraq are, as a consequence, still pending. The major outstanding issues relating to past proscribed missile programmes include accounting for certain missile components; identification of all equipment and items procured for, or used in, proscribed activities; and full disclosure of foreign assistance received by Iraq from a number of countries. The resolution of these and other remaining issues would be greatly expedited if Iraq provided documentation or other supporting evidence which would allow independent verification. The Commission has repeatedly called upon Iraq to adopt an attitude of full openness and cooperation on matters relating to its past programmes consistent with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions.

(b) Inspection activities

BM25/UNSCOM 81

7. BM25/UNSCOM 81 was in Iraq from 14 to 22 June 1994. The objectives of this team were twofold. First, to discuss unresolved issues related to past prohibited activities in Iraq, including missile production, modification projects and foreign supplies. Secondly, to elaborate, to Iraq's experts, definitions of the dual-purpose items and technologies contained in annex IV to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.

8. As a special task, related to verification of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991), the team was requested to continue investigation into the alleged use of a high precision tracking radar to support launches of prohibited missiles in December 1990. Iraq's officials strongly denied that the radar had been used during those tests, or that it had been procured to support activities related to prohibited missiles. These denials contradicted information available to the Commission which indicated that the radar had been used in proscribed activities.

9. The Commission recently informed Iraq that, unless specific evidence were provided to prove clearly that the radar was not used in support of proscribed activities, the Commission, in accordance with its mandate to destroy or render harmless items prohibited under resolution 687 (1991), would proceed with the destruction of the radar. In response, Iraq has now acknowledged that the radar was intended to be used in both proscribed and non-proscribed activities. At the time of the writing of this report, discussions on this matter were continuing.

BM28/UNSCOM 98

10. The mission of BM28/UNSCOM 98 was to begin the process of compiling, in a single document, a coherent and detailed description of past proscribed missile programmes based on Iraq's statements and declarations. This mission was necessitated by the fragmentary nature of Iraq's declarations concerning its past missile programmes. It is using information obtained by the Commission from its own inspection activities and other sources. The effort was initiated by the Commission to assist Iraq in clarifying its reporting on past activities. It does not relieve Iraq of its obligations to provide to the Commission a full, final and complete accounting of its proscribed programmes as required by relevant Security Council resolutions.

11. BM28/UNSCOM 98 visited Iraq from 2 to 6 October and from 23 to 28 October 1994 to present to Iraq's experts the Commission's draft papers on past programmes. During its visits, the team reviewed these drafts with Iraq's authorities and interviewed a number of persons responsible for relevant activities. A follow-up team, BM30/UNSCOM 102, in Iraq from 9 to 16 December 1994, is continuing this effort.

12. This task will continue until the past programmes are clearly understood and properly documented. The Commission will evaluate all data obtained from Iraq with information obtained from a number of other sources in order to gain confidence, through analysis, in the completeness of Iraq's declarations.

2. Ongoing monitoring and verification

(a) Inspection activities

13. The current monitoring programme in the missile area constitutes a multi-layered system to accomplish the tasks of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in an efficient and practical manner. It covers, inter alia:

(a) A variety of sites and facilities currently engaged in missile activities or having relevant capabilities. At this moment, more than 30 facilities are being monitored;

(b) Activities crucial to reacquiring prohibited missiles. The focal points for monitoring include missile propellant mixers/extruders, equipment for liquid engine production and gyroscope balancing, missile/warhead assembly lines, a wind tunnel and static test stands. Special modes of monitoring, i.e., camera systems, were established to monitor these activities. The cameras'

recordings are analysed to extract information relevant for monitoring objectives;

(c) Specialized and dual-purpose equipment. Appropriate inventory control was established to monitor these items. For example, nearly 200 items have been tagged by the Commission. Many more are covered by facility protocols. Iraq's use of this equipment is checked by monitoring teams;

(d) Operational missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. More than 1,300 missiles have been tagged by the Commission and are regularly checked for non-modification. In some instances, subsystems or components have been separately tagged.

BM26/UNSCOM 82

14. The Commission decided to use cameras and other sensors to increase the effectiveness of monitoring activities at a number of missile-related facilities. The task of BM26/UNSCOM 82 was to install the monitoring camera systems. The team operated in Iraq from 3 to 28 July 1994, and installed some 50 cameras with associated equipment at 15 sites being monitored. The team also placed tags and inventory labels on equipment identified for monitoring.

15. After a period of initial operation of the camera systems, a special sensor testing team was dispatched to Iraq from 8 to 16 August 1994. The team's mission was to validate the operational capabilities of the camera monitoring systems (through tests of sensor and communication technologies), operation and maintenance procedures, and processing modalities. The team provided recommendations for improved use of sensor monitoring systems in the missile area.

16. The product from the missile monitoring cameras is reviewed in three stages. First, each site is called up on a daily basis to check that the link is working. Secondly, the tape is reviewed by the resident missile monitoring team. Thirdly, the tape is dispatched for detailed expert analysis. The tapes are retained by the Commission for future comparative work.

BM27/UNSCOM 85

17. This team was in Iraq from 15 to 24 July 1994 with the primary mission of collecting updated information on and, by extension, updating the Commission's assessments of missile research and development activities in Iraq. Such updates are based on Iraq's declarations, special reports by Iraq and data collected by inspection teams. They are undertaken by the Commission on a biannual basis. BM27/UNSCOM 85 was the second team to perform such a task.

18. Extensive discussions were held with Iraqi officials and missile experts to obtain information relevant to the team's mission. Iraq submitted a detailed report on current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres. The team reaffirmed limitations established by the Commission on some missile design features so as to preclude any development of missiles capable of exceeding a range of 150 kilometres.

19. BM27/UNSCOM 85 also continued investigations into a number of issues related to research and development activities carried out by Iraq relating to past proscribed missile programmes.

Missile monitoring group 1

20. Upon completion of the baseline process in the missile area, in August 1994 the Commission dispatched the first missile monitoring group of resident inspectors to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. Such groups now operate continuously from the Centre and are a core element in the ongoing monitoring and verification system in Iraq. Monitoring groups have to perform a variety of missions, including:

(a) Execution of monitoring inspections on a regular basis at all missile-related sites being monitored;

(b) Checks of the tagged operational missiles;

(c) Initial assessment and verification of Iraq's declarations and reports;

(d) Maintaining a current inventory of items being monitored;

(e) Initial screening of the output of the sensor monitoring system;

(f) Specific short-notice tasks as directed by the Commission.

21. The first monitoring group (MG1) arrived in Iraq on 17 August and completed its mission on 9 October 1994. The group was composed of four experts specializing in various areas of missile development and production. During the mission, the group carried out 48 inspections of sites on a no-notice or short-notice basis. The group provided detailed reports on the progress of permitted missile programmes in Iraq and Iraq's current use of its dual-purpose capabilities.

Missile monitoring group 2

22. The second monitoring group (MG2) entered Iraq on 14 October 1994, and is scheduled to maintain the continuous missile monitoring presence until early February 1995. The personnel on the team will be rotated at staggered times to ensure that an experienced cadre of personnel remain in Iraq during the turnover to the next monitoring team in February. As at 8 December 1994, the second monitoring group had conducted 60 visits to facilities being monitored.

Missile monitoring groups 2A and 2B

23. Special groups (MG2A and MG2B) were sent to Iraq to supplement the expertise of monitoring group 2 to verify the non-modification of operational missiles covered by the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, which were originally tagged by UNSCOM 80 in June 1994. Monitoring group 2A was in Iraq from 19 to 22 October 1994 and monitoring group 2B carried out its mission from 2 to 6 December 1994. Iraq brought forward all the missiles requested for

verification by the Commission. The teams verified all tags and compared the operational missiles with technical reference material to ensure that Iraq had performed no modifications to increase the range of those missiles.

(b) Ongoing monitoring and verification declarations

24. In general, declarations in respect of ongoing monitoring and verification have been adequate in the missile area over the reporting period, most anomalies having been detected and corrected during the earlier baseline inspections. Nevertheless, omissions continue to be discovered, but it is anticipated that these will be corrected during the current phase of monitoring.

B. Chemical weapons

25. Since the last report on its activities the Commission has pursued in tandem the development of chemical monitoring and its implementation. At the same time, clarification of outstanding aspects of the past chemical weapons programmes continues to be a major concern.

1. Past programmes

(a) Information

26. Full knowledge and accounting of Iraq's past programmes is the key to ensuring that proscribed programmes have been eliminated and to confirming that the monitoring regime encompasses all equipment, technology and material in Iraq with potential for use for chemical weapons purposes.

27. The Commission has continued its efforts to fill gaps in Iraq's declarations on its past chemical weapons programmes, particularly those relating to suppliers and quantities of items and materials imported. In addition, strenuous attempts have been made to find ways to verify independently Iraq's accounting of the past programmes. During the reporting period, some 10 bilateral discussions with supporting Governments have taken place and a considerable amount of data on Iraq's imports has been obtained by the Commission.

28. The Commission considered that a major breakthrough had been achieved in verifying Iraq's declaration on imports of proscribed materials as a result of the CW15/UNSCOM 74 inspection in April 1994. That team was sent to Iraq specifically to address the issue of verification of past imports. During the inspection, the team was given a list of letters of credit which the Iraqi side claimed to cover all items imported in support of the chemical weapons programmes. The Commission energetically pursued this issue with the Governments of the suppliers concerned in order to verify the quantities supplied and the dates of supply. However, as a result of detailed analysis of the list of letters of credit and of the information from supporting Governments, the Commission has concluded that the list is not complete and contains errors. The consequence of the inconsistencies is that uncertainties remain, inter alia, about the amount of chemical agent produced, the amount of

precursors imported and consumed, and the amount of production equipment imported. The Commission is actively endeavouring to resolve these inconsistencies and uncertainties with Iraq and supplier Governments.

(b) Inspection activities

CW21/UNSCOM 95

29. CW21/UNSCOM 95 was sent to Iraq from 23 to 27 October 1994 to address anomalies in the list of letters of credit and outstanding information from Iraq on its past programmes. It also sought to collect such data as it could in order to improve the Commission's understanding of the past chemical weapons programmes.

30. During initial discussions, Iraq maintained that the list of letters of credit was complete. However, the team cited general examples of areas of omissions in Iraq's declarations. The incomplete nature of the list was further underlined during interviews with persons associated with the past programmes who referred to imported items of equipment not included in declarations.

31. In the course of the discussions and questioning, the team collected sufficient information and evidence to conclude that Iraq's previous declarations contained significant inconsistencies concerning purchases of precursor chemicals and equipment, equipment utilization and supplier companies. Iraq admitted that the list of letters of credit was not 100 per cent complete, but claimed that it was 90 to 95 per cent complete. The resultant uncertainties, together with other information available to the Commission, potentially translate into several hundred tons of unaccounted-for chemical warfare agents.

32. Iraq has therefore been asked to supply a new full, final and complete declaration, with supporting evidence for its past programmes. Once this has been received, the Commission will undertake a further verification exercise. In order to clarify inconsistencies in Iraq's declarations referring to chemical weapons-related munitions, an inspection will take place in January to address this particular issue.

2. Ongoing monitoring and verification

33. Monitoring in the chemical area has been addressed in four interrelated ways. The first is through the Commission's continued investigations into past Iraqi chemical weapons programmes. A complete understanding of Iraq's technical capabilities, manufacturing equipment, precursor suppliers and past chemical weapon production activities are essential if the Commission is to be confident that it is monitoring from a solid base. Secondly, the Commission conducted a site sweep and hand-over of the Muthanna State Establishment which is now being monitored. This facility was the hub of Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes, and contained the bulk of the declared and discovered chemical agent, filled munitions, and munition case production and filling equipment. The site survey and hand-over teams established that the site was free of prohibited materials and that all dual-use equipment at the site had been

destroyed or properly tagged and recorded. Thirdly, protocol-building missions were conducted at a variety of chemical sites. Finally, the chemical monitoring group was established in Iraq as part of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and commenced monitoring activities.

(a) Inspection activities

CW19/UNSCOM 89

34. The second chemical protocol-building team operated in Iraq from 10 to 23 August 1994. Its task was to build protocols for 22 chemical facilities associated with the oil and petrochemical industry. These sites are of relevance to the monitoring regime because of the potential presence of either equipment or raw chemicals which could be used in the production of chemical warfare agents, or equipment which could be used to store such chemicals.

35. The team verified declared equipment and activities at the sites declared for monitoring. It also collected the information required for the building of protocols for each of the sites.

CW20/UNSCOM 91

36. This team conducted its activities in Iraq from 13 to 24 September 1994. Its principal task was to conduct protocol-building inspections at 12 sites associated primarily with Iraq's chemical fertilizer industry. The inspections were undertaken in order to identify possible dual-purpose equipment, facility or equipment redundancies, plant capacity and normal utilization, unusual chemical processes, and waste disposal methods and to resolve anomalies in Iraq's declarations concerning the sites. In the course of the inspection, the team was able to obtain the information required to build protocols.

Chemical monitoring group 1

37. The first chemical monitoring group (CG1), comprising four chemical experts, arrived in Iraq on 2 October 1994. As the first monitoring team in the chemical area, it is refining the chemical monitoring process and the information requirements for facility protocols and baseline inspections.

38. Under the guidance of the Commission in New York, the chemical group undertakes the following tasks:

(a) Revision of site protocols;

(b) Tagging and monitoring of dual-use chemical processing equipment;

(c) Conducting inspections of newly declared and undeclared sites of potential relevance to the chemical monitoring regime;

(d) Collection, assessments and recording of monitoring sensor data;

(e) No-notice tasks as directed by the Commission.

39. In addition to conducting inspections at sites for which monitoring and verification protocols have been prepared, the monitoring group will visit various chemical-related organizations to assess their relevance to ongoing monitoring and verification.

40. The team also investigates outstanding anomalies in Iraq's declarations concerning its current dual-purpose capabilities. Minor adjustments have been made by the Commission to the formats under which Iraq reports such capabilities in order to facilitate both the collection of data by Iraq and its analysis by the Commission. The team explains these changes to its Iraqi counterparts and provides further clarifications, as necessary, to enable Iraq to provide full and consistent declarations.

41. In support of future ongoing monitoring and verification in the chemical area, the Commission intends to install further sensors. A team is currently in the country preparing for the installation in January of an additional 20 air-sampling devices at four additional chemical production facilities of particular importance to the monitoring regime. In addition, it is planned to install flow meters at key points in the production equipment at at least one site. Several sites will be monitored by remote-controlled cameras.

42. Analysis of the samples taken by air samplers is currently being conducted in laboratories outside Iraq. However, when the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre has been completely equipped, it is intended that analysis of the samples will be undertaken at the chemical laboratory in the Centre. Only those samples which deviate from the normal background levels will be sent to approved international laboratories in order to obtain a cross-checking result from an independent source. From time to time, calibrating exercises will be undertaken to ensure the accuracy of analysis at the various laboratories. The presence of this analytical equipment will also enable other analytical questions to be dealt with at the Centre.

(b) Ongoing monitoring and verification declarations

43. Information provided by Iraq in respect of ongoing monitoring and verification in the chemical field has generally been reasonably accurate. Thus far no major inconsistencies have been encountered during the reporting period.

C. Biological weapons

1. Past programmes

44. Iraq has declared having undertaken biological research for military purposes at the Salman Pak site operated by Iraq's Technical Research Centre. During the first biological inspection in 1991, Iraq stated that the research could be used for defensive or offensive purposes, and concentrated on three agents, namely, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin) and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene).

45. Owing to the lack of supporting data, verification of Iraq's accounting for the storage and disposal of equipment, storage of organisms, personnel,

relationships between the declared biological weapon research site and other organizations, and the acquisition of biotechnology has proved difficult. An accurate and verified account of these is essential if the Commission is to be certain that it is indeed monitoring the full extent of Iraq's dual-purpose biological capabilities. Furthermore, it will enable the Commission to focus its main monitoring efforts on key sites. The Commission has therefore continued to investigate past programme-related activities. Given the claimed destruction of all documentation related to the programme, verification of Iraq's account has, as in other areas, had to rely in large measure on interviews with personnel directly involved in the programme and indirect means of substantiation.

BW15/UNSCOM 104

46. BW15/UNSCOM 104 took place from 15 to 22 November 1994. Its prime activity was the interviewing of Iraqi officials who may have been associated with the past programme, in order to clarify the following points:

(a) Links between the Salman Pak site and other organizations;

(b The logic of the programme, including doctrine, practice, priorities, achievements, acquisition of biotechnology and know-how, protection and medical aspects, storage and rationale for location of the programme;

(c) A material balance for equipment, cell stocks and complex media acquired by Salman Pak or the programme;

(d) The real extent and intentions of the programme.

47. During the inspection, the team held discussions with 28 persons, many of whom had never been in contact with the Commission's experts before, including 9 of the 10 employees at Salman Pak. Access to personnel, whose identity had not previously been disclosed, therefore, constituted a major step forward. While the Commission remains unconvinced that Iraq's account of its past programme is either complete or accurate, this team did obtain new information, the significance of which requires further examination.

48. UNSCOM 104 continued the discussions with Iraq initiated during UNSCOM 96 on various direct and indirect means to substantiate Iraq's accounts in the absence of supporting documents or proof. Iraq agreed to try to provide such substantiation shortly after UNSCOM 104 left the country. In addition, various outstanding questions related to ongoing monitoring and verification declarations were addressed. Revised declarations were submitted, as requested by UNSCOM 96, and were further revised in the light of the team's comments.

2. Ongoing monitoring and verification

49. In preparation for the monitoring of Iraq's biological activities, the Commission has proceeded with the evaluation of the sites or facilities concerned by assessing the various elements which constitute Iraq's capability.

BW7/UNSCOM 86

50. Biological technical talks (BW7/UNSCOM 86) were held in Baghdad from 5 to 8 June 1994. The purpose was to try to clarify inconsistencies and anomalies between declarations concerning biological issues submitted by Iraq in January and April 1994 and the findings of BW4/UNSCOM 72, which visited many of the sites covered by their declarations for the first time.

51. During those talks, Iraq agreed to provide declarations and supplementary information regarding 24 sites. With respect to declarations, discussions focused on universities, breweries, facilities indigenously producing or modifying declarable equipment and import facilities. It was reiterated to Iraq that it was required to provide declarations for all dual-purpose capabilities covering the period from January 1986 to February 1994, including any facility related in any way to biological weapons activities. The form for 30-day prior notification of movement or modification of dual-use equipment, discussed during an earlier inspection, was provided to the Iraqi side. No such notification has yet been received by the Commission.

BW6/UNSCOM 84

52. BW6/UNSCOM 84 was in Iraq from 25 June to 5 July 1994. Its task was to survey 35 biological sites, some of which had not been declared by Iraq, in order to assess whether they should be monitored. Several sites were selected to test the practicality of the concept of the draft biological protocol. The sites chosen had been visited previously and covered four different activity areas, namely vaccine production, supplier company, research and development laboratory and single-cell production facility.

53. Eight of the undeclared sites were determined by the team to require monitoring as dual-purpose equipment was present or because of the nature of the activities conducted.

54. The team provided Iraq with a format for the provision of additional information required to complete the protocols and reiterated previous unfulfilled requests for information.

BW8/UNSCOM 87

55. BW8/UNSCOM 87 was in Iraq from 25 July to 7 September 1994 to create protocols for 55 sites which had been identified for monitoring.

56. However, the team observed inconsistencies and anomalies between its findings and those of previous inspection teams and the information contained in Iraq's various declarations. These related largely to equipment which had either been moved to the sites since the previous inspection or not been previously declared as being at those sites. Information on personnel, previously absent from declarations, was obtained during this inspection. None the less, queries concerning personnel present at sites, relationships between sites, and relationships to the past military biological programme were not fully clarified. During the course of the inspection, Iraq declared to the team

the names of further sites at which biological equipment or activities were present, and the team inspected those sites.

Technical talks held in New York in July

57. Technical talks held in New York during July 1994 concentrated upon the full provision of information requested during BW7/UNSCOM 86 and which remained outstanding, such as documentation concerning the import of biological materials by import company and information on relevant university activities.

BW9/UNSCOM 88

58. The team was in Iraq from 20 to 25 August 1994 and visited five biological facilities. Its objectives were to perform a feasibility study of remote monitoring in the biological area and, for the sites where this was deemed feasible, to establish the scope, foundations and requirements for the installation of remote monitors at biological sites. It concluded that, at those sites, remote monitoring equipment could constitute an effective means of supplementary on-site inspections.

BW10/UNSCOM 92

59. The team was in Iraq from 29 August to 3 September 1994. Its objectives were to complete the protocol-building process at certain sites and to inspect additional sites in order to assess whether they should be monitored.

60. The team visited a total of seven sites. On the basis of its results, two further sites were deemed as requiring monitoring.

BW11/UNSCOM 94

61. BW11/UNSCOM 94 was in Iraq from 29 September to 14 October 1994. Its main objective was to continue the inventorying and tagging of dual-use biological equipment started in May 1994 with BW5/UNSCOM 78 in order to address the anomalies in the equipment inventories observed during BW8/UNSCOM 87. UNSCOM 94 also determined the reasons for damage to or loss of tags noted during past inspections.

Technical talks held in New York in September

62. The discussions held in New York in September were in preparation for BW12/UNSCOM 96. They covered activities since 1986, monitoring, and Iraq's biological capability. The Commission presented the various steps taken so far in preparation for monitoring, and the difficulties encountered in certain areas in gathering the information required, especially in the field of research. It was agreed that a list of additional information required would be discussed and provided during BW12/UNSCOM 96.

BW12/UNSCOM 96

63. BW12/UNSCOM 96 held discussions with Iraqi officials at the National Monitoring Directorate from 23 to 26 September 1994. The main topics of

discussion were discrepancies between inspection findings and declarations; the difficulties encountered in reconciling information from both sources; declarations or additional sites previously requested; movement or modification of equipment; indigenous production of fermenters; import activities; the relationship between various biological sites; storage of equipment; work with certain micro-organisms; damaged or lost tags; management structure at the sites; future biological activities; declarations for activities conducted between January 1986 and February 1994; and past biological weapons work.

64. During the discussions, the scope of the monitoring effort and of the reporting requirements under the plan was reiterated, and the link between past activities and ongoing monitoring and verification outlined. Throughout the discussions, examples of indirect means of substantiation were explored as an alternative to the provision of supporting documentation, given Iraq's claim to have destroyed all relevant documentation. The need for the site managers to be familiarized with their reporting obligations was also addressed.

BW13/UNSCOM 99

65. BW13/UNSCOM 99 started its activity in Iraq on 2 December 1994. Its main purpose is to continue the inventorying of research, development and production equipment recently declared by Iraq.

BW16/UNSCOM 105

66. This inspection, which started on 2 December 1994, initiated interim monitoring of a key production site. The interim monitoring will, in the first instance, undertake an in-depth analysis of the activities of the site in order to redress the inadequacy of and inconsistencies in Iraq's previous declarations concerning this site.

67. By actively pursuing the data through interim monitoring, the Commission is relying less on Iraq's openness and more on inspection findings to obtain the baseline information for this site. However, this is a very time-consuming process and so can only be performed for a limited number of sites. The interim monitoring process does not remove the requirement for Iraq to declare accurately all its relevant dual-purpose biological activities.

D. Nuclear

68. The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is reporting separately on the activities of the action team set up to implement paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

69. The Commission continues, in accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (iii) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 715 (1991), to assist and cooperate with the IAEA action team through the provision of special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the IAEA plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. In accordance with paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 715 (1991), it continues to designate sites for inspection. In

accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 707 (1991), it continues to receive and decide on requests from Iraq to move or destroy any material or equipment relating to its nuclear weapons programme or other nuclear activities. Furthermore, it continues, in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 715 (1991), to perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director-General of IAEA, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, including making use of commonly available services and information to the fullest possible extent, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources.

Gamma survey

70. A presentation on the final results of the gamma surveys undertaken in September and December 1993 was made to the Commission on 22 September 1994. The capability of the helicopter-borne detection system has been discussed not only as a means of detecting previously undeclared sites for designation by the Commission but also in respect of its future use as a major tool in the ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.

71. The results of the gamma missions have shown the ability of the system to provide the Commission and IAEA with the capability to conduct survey missions for detection of certain nuclear activities through the detection of trace radioactive materials over designated sites and to execute current monitoring missions over declared sites. The system is also useful in mapping the level and isotope distribution of radioactive sources over a significant surface area. Use of the gamma mapping in association with the current environmental sampling being undertaken by IAEA could improve detection capabilities significantly and strengthen the overall monitoring system.

72. For some sites the results of the gamma mission have shown unidentified radioactive emissions from unidentified sources which will be investigated during future inspections.

Status of nuclear fuel removal

73. In the period under review, the reprocessing of the irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies removed from Iraq under the contract between IAEA and CIR Minatom has been completed at the Mayak facility in the Russian Federation. The uranium oxide resulting from the reprocessing is being moved to the Elektrostahl facility, also in the Russian Federation, where it will be placed under IAEA safeguards. Vitrification of the waste resulting from the reprocessing is also near completion. In Vienna, at the beginning of December, preliminary discussions were held between the IAEA action team and CIR Minatom regarding procedures for the sale of the reprocessed uranium oxide. As operations under the fuel removal and reprocessing contract are nearly complete, the final payments due from the United Nations under contract in the amount of some US$ 3,900,000 will have to be made early in 1995. This will constitute a further drain on the funds available to the Commission and IAEA in the carrying out of their mandates.

E. Aerial surveillance

74. The aerial inspection team continues to undertake aerial inspections at sites being monitored and at new facilities considered to be of possible relevance to the Commission's mandate. Where required, the team also provides support to ground inspections. All aerial inspections continue to be conducted on a no-notice basis, utilizing the Commission's three CH-53G helicopters. To date over 500 aerial inspections have been undertaken by the team.

75. In response to the evolving requirements of ongoing monitoring and verification, the aerial inspection team has made a number of changes to its method of operations. As the expert monitoring groups have become established at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, members of those groups are accompanying the aerial inspection team on relevant aerial missions. This allows the experts to advise the aerial inspectors to focus on particular areas or activities of importance at the facilities.

76. It is planned to move the aerial inspection team's film development laboratory from its present location in the Commission's Bahrain field office to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The team's photographic library will also move. This contains copies of all imagery and reports prepared by the team since the commencement of aerial inspections in June 1992. Immediate access to this historical imagery will enhance the aerial and ground teams' operations by allowing them to study sites in advance of inspections and thus readily to detect any external changes which have taken place at a facility since the previous inspection. Additional equipment has also been procured for the team to assist in refining and improving the product from the aerial inspections.

77. The Commission's high altitude surveillance aircraft, the U-2, continues to undertake an average of one to two flights a week. As at 6 December 1994, 229 missions have been flown. The imagery obtained from these missions is crucial to the Commission's operational planning.

Appendix II

A. Export/import monitoring mechanism

1. During the period covered by the present report* progress has been made towards the presentation to the Security Council of a proposal for a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions once the sanctions on those items have been lifted. Paragraph 7 of Council resolution 715 (1991) requires such a mechanism to be developed in cooperation between the Security Council Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) (the Sanctions Committee), the Special Commission and the Director-General of IAEA.

2. A concept paper for the mechanism, prepared by the Commission and IAEA, has been submitted to the Sanctions Committee. Informal discussions in that Committee appeared to reveal that a consensus could be reached on the proposal in the paper, once the Sanctions Committee had before it a more detailed list of items to be reported under the mechanism by exporting Governments and Iraq than was available in the annexes to the Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

3. Accordingly, revisions to the annexes in the chemical, biological and missile areas were prepared, and these were submitted, together with the previously revised annex in the nuclear area (S/24300), to an informal meeting of international experts, held in New York on 18 and 19 October 1994, in order to determine the adequacy of the revisions for purposes of implementing an export reporting procedure. While the lists were in large measure approved, proposals were made for some further changes. These changes have now been made and the lists circulated to the participants in the meeting for comments, most of which have been received. It is intended to reconvene the informal meeting at the end of the first week of January 1995, to receive the final drafts of the lists, to consider the draft reporting forms to be submitted by Governments pursuant to the mechanism, and to discuss the practical implementation of the mechanism. Immediately after that meeting, it is hoped to be able to resubmit to the Sanctions Committee the concept paper, with the draft revised annexes to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. When the concurrence of the Sanctions Committee is obtained in the course of January 1995, the proposal for the mechanism will be put before the Security Council for approval in a resolution to be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. The revisions to the annexes to the plans will also be brought to the attention of the Council, in accordance with the procedures for revision of the annexes already approved by the Council and contained in the Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing

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* For developments up to mid-June 1994, see S/1994/750, paragraphs 26 to 28. For developments from mid-June to the beginning of October 1994, see S/1994/1138, paragraphs 26 to 31.

monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22871/Rev.2 and Corr.1, paras. 26 and 41).

B. Resource implications

4. The number of personnel and material resources required to support the export/import mechanism derives from the volume of data which the mechanism will generate. This figure, in turn, is derived from the volume of dual-use items which will be imported by Iraq. The Commission is currently engaged in analytical studies to acquire broad outline figures for the likely level of reportable items.

5. Dual-use items imported into Iraq before the imposition of sanctions should have been either destroyed or consumed, or should be currently subjected to the monitoring regime. In the missile, chemical, biological and nuclear fields, the numbers of items of dual-use equipment destroyed under United Nations supervision or currently being monitored ranges from 500 to 1,000 separate pieces. Assuming that these items were imported during a period of approximately two to five years, the number of shipments of dual-use items could be expected not to exceed 2,000 during a normal year. Assessments of export patterns from Western countries into countries similar to Iraq confirm these figures. Further analysis and refinement of the figures will take place over the coming months as further data becomes available.

6. Notwithstanding the absence of precise figures relating to the volume of material anticipated under the export/import mechanism, the broad framework under which the regime will operate is currently being established. When operational, the export-import mechanism will constitute one of the main pillars of the ongoing monitoring and verification regime, and the Commission and IAEA's experts in New York, Vienna and Baghdad will be heavily involved in reviewing and assessing the information provided by Iraq and exporting Governments under the mechanism.

7. To administer the mechanism there will be export/import units staffed by customs experts and data entry personnel in Baghdad and New York. These units will be responsible for receiving the notification forms, ensuring their timely and efficient processing by the Commission's and IAEA's experts as may be the case, and the dissemination of information. In Iraq, the customs experts, in conjunction with the monitoring experts, will also undertake no-notice inspections at, inter alia, points of entry into Iraq, in order to verify that all relevant items are being declared. In view of the commercial sensitivity of data supplied under the export/import regime, special measures will be taken to ensure the security of this data.

8. On the basis of the figures set out above, the Commission currently envisages recruiting six to eight additional experts for its New York staff to process and analyse the data generated by the mechanism.

Appendix III

Information Assessment Unit

The Information Assessment Unit is in the process of developing a new computer system which will form the key analytical tool for ongoing monitoring and verification and future export/import operations and analysis. The system will hold computerized versions of the site protocols, including declarations, inspection reports, imagery and maps. Work has already begun on creating a database to support export/import operations, which will be linked to the computerized site protocols, thus allowing the analysts to review items on order or being imported for each facility being monitored. In addition, the database will permit manipulation of information to allow assessments to be made on the total volume of items, such as dual-use chemicals, being imported into Iraq. In this manner, experts will at any time be able to make assessments about Iraq's potential capabilities to produce banned items, either at an individual site or throughout Iraq, and so will be better able to direct the Commission's monitoring of sites and imports to focus on the most significant issues.

Appendix IV

Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

A. Concept and background information

1. On 1 August 1994, the Commission established the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. In part, its establishment enabled the Executive Chairman to declare the ongoing monitoring and verification system provisionally operational.

2. The Centre provides offices, laboratories, and operational support for Commission and IAEA resident inspectors. The resident staff includes professional specialists in biological, chemical, and nuclear issues; missiles; aerial photography and interpretation and camera and other sensor technology. In the near future, it will include experts in export/import control of dual-use items. The resident and visiting inspectors are supported by a small staff led by the Director of the Centre. It should be noted that the Centre not only offers office space and common support for the inspectors, but also affords the opportunity for inter-disciplinary analysis of the data available to experts. This opportunity has become increasingly evident during inspections conducted in November and December 1994.

3. The Centre is located in the Canal Hotel, a building made available by the Government of Iraq for the exclusive use of the United Nations in the mid-1980s. The facility is managed by the United Nations Administrative Unit, Baghdad, for a variety of United Nations organizations. At the proposal of the Executive Chairman of the Commission, Iraq agreed that the Canal Hotel should serve as the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.

B. Engineering support

4. Immediately prior to the beginning of the reporting period, the Commission undertook a survey of the engineering support required to reconfigure the designated area in the Canal Hotel in a manner suitable for the tasks of the Centre.

5. The survey also indicated that the Centre would require extensive engineering support in a number of areas:

(a) Reconfiguration of a large number of the rooms;

(b) Rewiring of the electrical circuits and repair of the plumbing for the offices;

(c) Physical barriers and control points needed to be installed at the numerous access points to ensure the security of the Centre.

6. In mid-July, the Al-Fao Construction Bureau was designated to perform the work. The indifferent quality of the workforce, the lack of qualified

supervisors and the need for remedial repairs delayed the completion of the work.

7. The Iraqi renovation project was observed by construction engineers provided by a contributing Government. Their assessment of the facility and of the many requirements within the Centre indicated that the scope of engineering support must be enlarged to correct the deficiencies of the initial renovation and to engage in other projects to complete the facility. At the same time, efforts were made to arrange for engineering support for the long term. A fundamental consideration for these arrangements was the establishment and maintenance of a secure facility. This important factor made it necessary for the Commission to approach several Member States for both near- and long-term engineering support.

8. As the current reporting period closes, contributing Governments have provided craftsmen in response to specific requests for assistance, namely, installing locks; surveying the electric power system; completing a two-stage electric rewiring project; building the work surfaces and shelving in the operations room, the aerial inspection team offices and the laboratories; and designing the electrical system for the biological laboratory.

C. Security measures

9. Concerns about Centre security arise from many sources. Security of information, analyses and deliberations within the Centre is an essential element of the efficacy of ongoing monitoring and verification. Information security must encompass not only the findings of inspectors, but also the proprietary data of the notifications submitted to the Commission by Iraq and by the exporting Governments concerning dual-use items. Physical security must provide assurance of control over all possible access points. A number of contributing Governments have made available technical experts and equipment to assist the Commission with its security programme.

D. Equipment and furniture donations

10. Contributing Governments of four States and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) have provided, and continue to provide equipment, including furniture, for the Centre. Two Governments donated furniture and expendable supplies from their former embassy compounds in Baghdad. ESCWA is lending large quantities of office furniture, which was in storage at the former ESCWA headquarters in Baghdad. A third Government is providing the internal security camera system, an important component to the security programme for the Centre, and a fourth Government has donated computers and associated equipment for use in Baghdad.

11. The monitoring systems that have been installed at sites selected for that purpose and that support the efforts of the resident and visiting inspectors have been donated by a Member State, and installed and maintained by its technicians with assistance from technicians from other Governments. Most of the camera systems include real-time transmission from the remote sites so that

the Centre may monitor system performance. It is expected that all remote cameras will incorporate this feature in the coming months. The Centre also receives data from associated sensors and from alarm devices that record interference with the monitoring. The contributing Governments have established an initial, periodic maintenance schedule, continually to ensure that the remote site systems are in working order.

E. Personnel of the Centre

12. The establishment of the Centre on 1 August was signified by the arrival of the first Director. The continuous presence of inspectors from a variety of disciplines has created new, and in many ways unforeseen, opportunities to enhance the Commission's capabilities and performance.

13. The Centre provides support for approximately 50 personnel in residence as well as support for a 31-person detachment of the German Army brigade that operates the Commission's three CH-53G helicopters. The number of resident experts will increase with the advent of the export/import mechanism. Visiting teams will temporarily expand the presence of the Commission and IAEA.

14. Recruitment of personnel for the Centre takes a variety of forms. Some Member States have made an ongoing commitment to make available a particular expertise. Most of the monitoring group inspectors are recruited through the Permanent Missions in New York. This continuous process of recruitment commenced formally with a presentation to over 20 Member States in late May 1994, and has worked well to provide personnel for all required positions in a timely manner during the reporting period.

F. Future developments

15. The complete establishment of the Centre will be but one factor in the full implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification. Plans are in hand to install all the currently envisaged equipment and laboratories required to support the full operation of the Centre by the end of February 1995. When the staff arrives to operate and maintain the new equipment, the Centre should be fully staffed and equipped. Adjustments to staffing levels will be made in line with requirements and in the light of experience gained in operating the ongoing monitoring and verification regime. The prime expansion currently envisaged will be the arrival of export/import experts at the appropriate time, in preparation for the operation of the export/import mechanism.

Appendix V

Administrative and financial issues

A. Organizational and administrative issues

1. Since the last report, there have been no further changes in the composition of the Special Commission.

2. The organizational structure remains essentially as reported previously. Currently there are 41 staff in the office of the Executive Chairman, 23 in the Bahrain field office, and 69 in the Baghdad field office.

3. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Commission through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment. These contributions have been essential to the work of the Commission in every area.

B. Status, privileges and immunities

4. The status, privileges and immunities of the Commission, IAEA and the specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the relevant agreements and Council resolutions and decisions.

5. The Commission and IAEA on the one hand and the Government of Bahrain on the other have extended for a further six months, until 31 March 1995, the agreement provided for in the earlier exchanges of letters relating to the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Commission and IAEA in Bahrain.

C. Finance

6. A full account of the financial difficulties which have confronted the Commission is contained in annex III to the report contained in S/1994/1138 and Corr. 1. The financial situation of the Commission remains an area of great concern in view of the difficulties in ensuring proper funding for the operations in a planned manner. At this time, the only commitments received from Member States for additional contributions have been $2.5 million from Kuwait and $40,000 from Switzerland. Other Member States in the Gulf region have expressed their continuing support for the work of the Commission and it is hoped that cash contributions will follow. It is also expected, as was the case in the past, that a portion of the matching transfer of frozen Iraqi assets from the United States of America to the escrow account will be made available to the Commission to cover some of its 1995 requirements. In the best possible circumstances, at this point, funds can be identified only for the first three months of 1995. Beyond that, there are no identified funds in the escrow account to cover the Commission's operations. Obviously, if further funds are not identified in the near future, the incremental shut-down of the Commission's operations, as indicated in the Commission's letter to the President of the Security Council of 3 November 1994, will ensue.

Appendix VI

INSPECTION SCHEDULE

(In-country dates)

Nuclear

15-21 May 1991	IAEA1/UNSCOM 1
22 June-3 July 1991	IAEA2/UNSCOM 4
7-18 July 1991	IAEA3/UNSCOM 5
27 July-10 August 1991	IAEA4/UNSCOM 6
14-20 September 1991	IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
21-30 September 1991	IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
11-22 October 1991	IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
11-18 November 1991	IAEA8/UNSCOM 22
11-14 January 1992	IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
5-13 February 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
7-15 April 1992	IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
26 May-4 June 1992	IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
14-21 July 1992	IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
31 August-7 September 1992	IAEA14/UNSCOM 43
8-19 November 1992	IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
6-14 December 1992	IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
22-27 January 1993	IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
3-11 March 1993	IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
30 April-7 May 1993	IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
25-30 June 1993	IAEA20/UNSCOM 58
23-28 July 1993	IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
1-9 November 1993	IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
4-11 February 1994	IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
11-22 April 1994	IAEA24/UNSCOM 73
21 June-1 July 1994	IAEA25/UNSCOM 83
22 August-2 September 1994	IAEA26/UNSCOM 90
7-29 September 1994	NMG 94-01
14-21 October 1994	IAEA27/UNSCOM 93
29 September-21 October 1994	NMG 94-02

21 October-9 November 1994	NMG 94-03
8-29 November 1994	NMG 94-04
29 November-16 December 1994	NMG 94-05
16 December 1994-13 January 1995	NMG 94-06

Chemical

9-15 June 1991	CW1/UNSCOM 2
15-22 August 1991	CW2/UNSCOM 9
31 August-8 September 1991	CW3/UNSCOM 11
31 August-5 September 1991	CW4/UNSCOM 12
6 October-9 November 1991	CW5/UNSCOM 17
22 October-2 November 1991	CW6/UNSCOM 20
18 November-1 December 1991	CBW1/UNSCOM 21
27 January-5 February 1992	CW7/UNSCOM 26
21 February-24 March 1992	CD1/UNSCOM 29
5-13 April 1992	CD2/UNSCOM 32
15-29 April 1992	CW8/UNSCOM 35
18 June 1992-14 June 1994	CDG/UNSCOM 38
26 June-10 July 1992	CBW2/UNSCOM 39
21-29 September 1992	CW9/UNSCOM 44
6-14 December 1992	CBW3/UNSCOM 47
6-18 April 1993	CW10/UNSCOM 55
27-30 June 1993	CW11/UNSCOM 59
19-22 November 1993	CW12/UNSCOM 65
1-14 February 1994	CW13/UNSCOM 67
20-26 March 1994	CW14/UNSCOM 70
18-22 April 1994	CW15/UNSCOM 74
25 May-5 June 1994	CW16/UNSCOM 75
31 May-12 June 1994	CW17/UNSCOM 76
8-14 June 1994	CW18/UNSCOM 77
10-23 August 1994	CW19/UNSCOM 89
13-24 September 1994	CW20/UNSCOM 91
2 October 1994-15 January 1995	CG 1
23-27 October 1994	CW21/UNSCOM 95

Biological

2-8 August 1991	BW1/UNSCOM 7
20 September-3 October 1991	BW2/UNSCOM 15
11-18 March 1993	BW3/UNSCOM 53
8-26 April 1994	BW4/UNSCOM 72
28 May-7 June 1994	BW5/UNSCOM 78
24 June-5 July 1994	BW6/UNSCOM 84
5-8 June 1994	BW7/UNSCOM 86
25 July-7 September 1994	BW8/UNSCOM 87
20-25 August 1994	BW9/UNSCOM 88
29 August-3 September 1994	BW10/UNSCOM 92
29 September-14 October 1994	BW11/UNSCOM 94
23-26 September 1994	BW12/UNSCOM 96
15-22 November 1994	BW15/UNSCOM 104
2-10 December 1994	BW16/UNSCOM 105 (IMT)
2-14 December 1994	BW13/UNSCOM 99 (IMT)
9-19 December 1994	BW17/UNSCOM 106 (IMT)
28 December 1994-31 January 1995	IBG 1

Ballistic missiles

30 June-7 July 1991	BM1/UNSCOM 3
18-20 July 1991	BM2/UNSCOM 10
8-15 August 1991	BM3/UNSCOM 8
6-13 September 1991	BM4/UNSCOM 13
1-9 October 1991	BM5/UNSCOM 18
1-9 December 1991	BM6/UNSCOM 23
9-17 December 1991	BM7/UNSCOM 24
21-29 February 1992	BM8/UNSCOM 28
21-29 March 1992	BM9/UNSCOM 31
13-21 April 1992	BM10/UNSCOM 34
14-22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM 36
11-29 July 1992	BM12/UNSCOM 40A+B
7-18 August 1992	BM13/UNSCOM 42
16-30 October 1992	BM14/UNSCOM 45
25 January-23 March 1993	IMT1a/UNSCOM 48

12-21 February 1993	BM15/UNSCOM 50
22-23 February 1993	BM16/UNSCOM 51
27 March-17 May 1993	IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
5-28 June 1993	IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
10-11 July 1993	BM17/UNSCOM 60
24 August-15 September 1993	BM18/UNSCOM 62
28 September-1 November 1993	BM19/UNSCOM 63
21-29 January 1994	BM20/UNSCOM 66
17-25 February 1994	BM21/UNSCOM 69
30 March-20 May 1994	BM22/UNSCOM 71
20 May-8 June 1994	BM23/UNSCOM 79
10-24 June 1994	BM24/UNSCOM 80
14-22 June 1994	BM25/UNSCOM 81
3-28 July 1994	BM26/UNSCOM 82
15-24 July 1994	BM27/UNSCOM 85
17 August-9 October 1994	MG 1
2-6 October 1994	BM28/UNSCOM 98A
23-28 October 1994	BM28/UNSCOM 98B
14 October 1994-2 February 1995	MG 2
19-22 October 1994	MG 2A
2-6 December 1994	MG 2B
1-6 December 1994}	BM29/UNSCOM 101
9-14 December 1994}	
9-16 December 1994	BM30/UNSCOM 102

Computer search

12 February 1992	UNSCOM 30

Special missions

30 June-3 July 1991
11-14 August 1991
4-6 October 1991
11-15 November 1991
27-30 January 1992
21-24 February 1992

17-19 July 1992

28-29 July 1992

6-12 September 1992

4-9 November 1992

4-8 November 1992

12-18 March 1993

14-20 March 1993

19-24 April 1993

4 June-5 July 1993

15-19 July 1993

25 July-5 August 1993

9-12 August 1993

10-24 September 1993

27 September-1 October 1993

1-8 October 1993

5 October-16 February 1994

2-10 December 1993

2-16 December 1993

21-27 January 1994

2-6 February 1994

10-14 April 1994

24-26 April 1994

28-29 May 1994

4-6 July 1994

8-16 August 1994

15-19 September 1994

21-25 September 1994

23-26 September 1994

3-6 October 1994

4-20 November 1994

7-12 November 1994

14-17 November 1994

4-18 December 1994

14-20 December 1994